COMMENT
The Court-Ordered Predisposition Evaluation
Under Washington's Juvenile Justice Act: A
Violation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Juvenile offenders in Washington are sentenced under a
presumptive sentencing model that is designed to hold
juveniles accountable for crimes they have committed.' A
calculus using the offender's age, crime, and criminal history
determines the appropriate sanction.2 Often offenders are
required by the court to undergo a psychological evaluation
prior to sentencing. When this occurs, information the
offender reveals to the court-appointed specialist during the
evaluation is added to the sentencing decision. A longer sentence typically results.3 This Comment argues that when the
juvenile offender is ordered to submit to a predisposition evaluation, the privilege against self-incrimination should protect
the offender from unknowingly supplying the state with information that may be used to enhance his sentence beyond the
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40 (1985) (Juvenile Justice Act of 1977); infra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
2. State of Washington Juvenile Disposition Sentencing Standards, Division of
Juvenile Rehabilitation (1985); infra note 51 and accompanying text.
3. For example, in a case now pending before the Washington Supreme Court,
Anthony, a twelve year old boy, pleaded guilty to the offense of theft in the second
degree. The court ordered Anthony to undergo a psychological evaluation by a courtappointed psychologist prior to the disposition hearing. During the evaluation,
Anthony revealed incriminating information about the extent of his criminal activity
and his feelings about this behavior. Under Washington's presumptive sentencing
model, the standard sentence recommended for Anthony was confinement in a
juvenile institution for 21-28 weeks. Based largely on the information he revealed
during the court-ordered evaluation, Anthony was sentenced to a maximum term of 80
weeks of confinement in a juvenile institution. State v. Escoto, No. 52522-6 (Wash.
filed November 14, 1985).
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standard range.4
The privilege against self-incrimination is regarded as an
essential mainstay of our adversary system.5 Secured by the
fifth amendment of the federal constitution6 and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,7 the privilege against self-incrimination
protects an individual's right to a "private enclave where he
may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy."' The precise boundaries of the privilege, however,
are not so easily defined.
The United States Supreme Court has generally accorded
the privilege against self-incrimination a liberal construction.9
The Court has consistently held that the privilege can be
claimed in any proceeding, criminal or civil, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, in which disclosure
could lead to evidence that might be used in a criminal prosecution.1" In its more expansive opinions, the Court has stated
that the privilege against self-incrimination has a comprehensive scope in all settings in which an individual's freedom of
4. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss a juvenile's capacity to make
a knowing waiver in this context. Suffice it to say that in Washington, juveniles are
considered competent to knowingly waive their constitutional rights. Dutil v. State, 93
Wash. 2d 84, 606 P.2d 269 (1980); State v. Ellison, 36 Wash. App. 64, 676 P.2d 531 (1984).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
6. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

7. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("The Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against
federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty. . . for such
silence.").
The Washington State Constitution is a second source of protection against selfincrimination. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. The state right has been held to be identical
to the federal right. State v. Mecca Twin Theater & Film Exch., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 87,
91, 507 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1973).
8. Miranda,384 U.S. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579,
581-82 (2nd Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
9. Id. at 461. But see Allen v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2988 (1986).
10. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 46-48 (1967)
(quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J.,
concurring)).
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action is significantly curtailed,1 ' and that the privilege can be
claimed in any proceeding in which disclosure could be used to
deprive a person of his liberty. 2 In practice, deprivation of liberty is not dispositive in allowing the fifth amendment's
protection.

13

What is dispositive is the exposure to criminal punishment
that the compelled disclosure invites. In its most recent decision construing the privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court delineated the boundary between criminal (i.e., punitive) and noncriminal proceedings. 4 The fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is reserved for criminal
proceedings, although a " 'civil' label-of-convenience"' will not
turn an essentially criminal proceeding into one beyond the
6
reach of the fifth amendment's protection.'
In addition, the full scope of the privilege against selfincrimination during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding remains undefined. The prevalent sentencing philosophy is one of tailoring the sentence to fit the personality and
circumstances of the offender as well as the crime.' 7 This philosophy has fostered the widely accepted belief that the sentencing judge must have broad discretion to inquire into all
aspects of an offender's life.'" Because the judge's discretion is
to be exercised for rehabilitative and protective, not punitive,
purposes, 19 sentencing has acquired the character of an administrative rather than a judicial proceeding.2" The fundamental
sentencing principle is that "a judge may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which
it may come."'" Even with this rehabilitative rationale for sentencing, the privilege against self-incrimination has been
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.

12. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
13. See, e.g., Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to
Compelled PsychiatricExaminations? 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973).

14. Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
15. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.

16. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2995-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Note, ProceduralDue Process at Judicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 821, 823 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); D. BOERNER, SENTENCING

IN WASHINGTON, § 3.7 at 3-13 (1985); Note, supra note 17, at 823.
19. D. BOERNER, supra note 18, § 3.7 at 3-13.
20. Note, supra note 17, at 824.
21. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (quoting United States v.

Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).
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attached to sentencing proceedings in some circumstances.2 2
When the principles enunciated in these Supreme Court
decisions are applied to the juvenile court in Washington, the
distinctions between civil and criminal, rehabilitative and punitive collide. Technically civil proceedings, juvenile court adjudications seek to prove that a juvenile committed a criminal
act.23 Since at least 1967, juvenile court adjudications have
been recognized as comparable in seriousness to felony prosecutions. 24 And while the juvenile court movement grew from a
desire to provide rehabilitative services, 25 the current trend in
juvenile justice is to punish the youthful offender for crimes
committed.2 6 The traditional labels of "civil" and "criminal,"
"rehabilitative" and "punitive," have taken on new meaning in
the juvenile court context.
The essence of th[e] basic constitutional principle [embodied
in the privilege against self-incrimination] is the requirement that the state which proposes to convict and punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by the
independent labor of its own officers, not by27 the simple,
cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.
This Comment will analyze the significance of this principle by first looking at the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act;
second, by examining the status of the privilege against selfincrimination during sentencing; and third, by applying the
values protected by the privilege to the use of predisposition
psychological evaluations in Washington juvenile courts.
II.

JUVENILE COURT

Prior to the inception of the juvenile court movement in
the late 1800s, juvenile offenders over age seven were treated
in the same way as adult criminals.28 Social reform was initi22. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 310 (1986); Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.
1982); see also infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.

23. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1978).
24. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
25. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.

26. See MODEL JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE (American Legislative Exchange Council
1986).
27. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82
(1961)) (emphasis added by the Estelle Court).
28. See, e.g., Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom? 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401, 405-06
(1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1909).
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ated to create an informal juvenile court proceeding that
would enable the state to intervene in a child's best interest.2 9
Justice Fortas summarized the philosophy of this social reform
when he wrote for the majority in In re Gault:
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures
and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given
long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened
criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's
duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' but 'What is
he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
him from a downward career.' The child--essentially good,
as they saw it-was to be made 'to feel that he is the object
of [the state's] care and solicitude,' not that he was under
arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were
therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities,
technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both
substantive and criminal law were therefore to be discarded.
The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned.
The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through 30institutionalization,
were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive.
To effectuate the laudable objective of compassionate, individualized treatment, states accorded the juvenile court unbridled discretion. Juveniles had no procedural rights.3 1
Illinois first codified this new juvenile court philosophy
and structure in 1899, and the model soon spread to other
states. 2 In 1913 Washington adopted a broad statute that gave
29. During the same time period the adult criminal justice system was also
undergoing reform. The emerging social and psychological sciences influenced the
development of individualized sentencing. The old system of fixed penalties was
replaced by the rehabilitative concept of fashioning a sentence to fit the total
circumstances of the offender, and not merely extracting retribution for the crime
committed. See, Note, supra note 17, at 822-23.
30. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
31. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, which had been used in the English
chancery court to describe the power of the state to protect the property interests and
person of the child, the American court added the concept that the child had a right to
protective custody. If the parents failed to effectively perform this function, the state
could intervene. Since the child had no right to liberty, no rights were deprived by the
state's intervention. See, Gault,387 U.S. at 17 n.21; Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa.
1839); Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L.
REV. 289, 290 n.3 (1979).
32. See Mack, supra note 28, at 107.
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the court authority to intervene in the lives of delinquent or
dependent youth under the age of eighteen. 3 In Washington
as in other states, the legislature designed the juvenile code to
allow the court to diagnose social ills and deliver social services
for the sake of the child's best interest. As a civil proceeding
designed expressly for children, this individualized attention
was accomplished without the stigma of criminality or the
impediment of procedural rights for the youth.
The 1967 landmark decision of In re Gault3 4 dramatically
changed the character of juvenile court proceedings. Gerald
Gault, age fifteen, had been committed to an Arizona reform
school for up to six years for making a lewd phone call. This
crime, if committed by an adult, carried a maximum penalty of
a fine from five to fifty dollars, or up to two months in jail.
The Court reversed Gault's disposition and imposed on juvenile court proceedings the due process requirements of timely
notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court stated:
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone.... The absence of substantive standards
has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individual treatment.... Failure to observe the
fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to
individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is
the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact
which defines the rights of the individual
and delimits the
35
powers which the state may exercise.
The Gault opinion catalogued the benevolent motives and
the subsequent failures of the juvenile court movement. Even
so, the Court did not discard the concept of separate handling
of juveniles, and it carefully limited its holding to the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. 3 The subsequent
33. 1913 Wash. Laws ch. 160 at 520. In 1905 Washington created a separate
juvenile court for first and second class counties, and in 1909 added neglected children
to its jurisdiction. 1905 Wash. Laws ch. 18 at 35 (repealed 1909); 1909 Wash. Laws ch.
190 at 668-69 (repealed 1913); See Becker, supra note 31, at 290 n.5.

34. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 13, 18-20.
36. Id. at 13, 31 n.48.
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Supreme Court decision of In re Winship3 7 added the standard
of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to obtain a juvenile
court "conviction," increasing the similarities between the procedural safeguards afforded adults and juveniles in a criminal
proceeding.
Even with the increased formality and attention to
juveniles' due process rights brought about by Gault and Winship, the fundamental philosophy in juvenile court continued
to be one of parens patriae-benevolent intervention in the
best interest of the juvenile. In Washington, court and institutional staff had broad discretion within an indeterminate sentencing scheme to dictate the freedom of a juvenile until
rehabilitation occurred or the youth turned twenty-one.3 The
basic notion that it was the function of the juvenile court to
discover how the youth became what he was and to provide the
guidance and services needed to "save him from his downward
career" had not changed.
In 1977, the Washington legislature radically revised the
state's juvenile code, which had remained largely unchanged
since its 1913 enactment.3 9 A "justice" or "just deserts" model
replaced rehabilitation as the fundamental philosophy of the
juvenile court. The justice model emphasizes uniformity,
equity, fairness, and accountability in the court's response to
juvenile offenders.4 ° Representative Mary Kay Becker, prime
sponsor of the legislation, characterized the legislative purpose
as moving away from the parenspatriae philosophy to a more
classical emphasis on justice.4 The legislature instituted a pre37. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (A twelve year old boy was charged with stealing $112. The
Court found that the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required in the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are the other
constitutional safeguards applied in Gault.).
38. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 302(b) at 2478 (repealed 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 291 (81) at
1041).
39. H.R. Res. 371, 45th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1977) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE tit.
13 (Supp. 1977) (effective July 1, 1978)).
40. Schneider & Schram, An Assessment of Juvenile Justice Reform in
Washington State, Executive Summary 3 (Institute of Policy Analysis, 1983); A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66-76 (1976).
41. Becker, supra note 31, at 307-08:
In terms of the philosphical polarities that have characterized the juvenile
court debate for more than a century, the new law moves away from the
parens patriae doctrine of benevolent coercion, and closer to a more classical
The presumptive sentencing scheme is intended to
emphasis of justice ....
hold youngsters more accountable for their crimes by dealing with them
according to the nature and frequency of their criminal acts rather than on
The new
the basis of their social background and need for treatment ....
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sumptive sentencing scheme4 2 to hold offenders accountable
for the crimes they committed, rather than to sentence them
based on their social background or need for treatment.
To implement the tenets of the justice model, the Washington Juvenile Justice Act codifies the decisionmaking process and greatly reduces individual discretion at all stages of
the adjudicatory process. Intake and pre-adjudication decisions
are shifted from the probation department to the prosecutor. 43
When the information is legally sufficient, serious offenses
must be filed 44 and minor offenses must be diverted from the
45
formal court process.

Offenders are divided into three groups based on the seriousness of the current offense(s), age, and criminal history:
minor/first, middle, and serious offenders.4 6 Discretion in sentencing is proscribed by the category of offender. 47 A minor/
first offender may not be incarcerated, 4 a middle offender may
or may not be confined, 49 and a serious offender must be committed to a term of confinement. 50 Sentences are computed
terminology reflects the movement away from the 'benevolent treatment'
model in that it makes it clear that youngsters who are being sentenced-i.e.,
deprived of liberty---are being punished rather than 'treated.' The fiction of
the word 'delinquent' is replaced by the clearer term 'offender.' However,
courts do retain some latitude to pursue rehabilitative goals under the
provision that allows them to order counselling or other services as part of the
disposition of a middle-range offender.
42. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070 (1985).
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(5) (1985).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(6) (1985). Diversion refers to a process whereby
the offense is not formally adjudicated, but the offender enters into a diversion
agreement with a local conference committee comprised of community volunteers.
The diversion agreement may consist of no more than 150 community service hours,
restitution limited to the actual amount of the victim's loss and limited by the
juvenile's ability to pay, attendance of up to two hours of counseling or up to ten hours
of educational sessions, and a fine of no more than one hundred dollars, also
contingent on the juvenile's ability to pay. A juvenile may decline the diversion
agreement, in which case the prosecutor files for adjudication. If a juvenile fails to
comply with the terms of the diversion agreement, the charge is likewise filed. A
diversion agreement, while not a formal adjudication, does become part of a juvenile's
criminal history.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020 (1985).
47. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.40.025-.030 create the Juvenile Disposition Standards
Commission and vest in the Commission responsibility for the development of
presumptive sentences for all categories of offenders. Each even-numbered year, the
legislature reviews the proposed standards.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(2) (1985).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(4) (1985).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(1) (1985).
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using a formula that assigns a numerical value to the current
offense(s), the youth's age at the time of commission, and the
seriousness and recency of prior criminal offenses. The total
points an offender accumulates results in a presumptive
sentence.5 1
In the middle offender category, the court may exercise
the most discretion in sentencing since the presumptive
sentences contain both community supervision and incarceration options.5 2 The court may depart from the presumptive
sentence with any category of offender if imposition of this
sentence would constitute a manifest injustice.5 3 Such a finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, and
may result in either a decrease or increase in the severity of
the sentence.5
The Washington juvenile code, more than any juvenile justice code in the nation, distinctly separates the provision of
social services for troubled youth from the consequences due
when a juvenile breaks the law. The radical departure from
the traditional model of the juvenile court has been aptly
described as follows:
[T]he philosophy of the law is unambiguous. There was no
attempt to incorporate the new approach, with its emphasis
on accountability, uniformity, proportionality, and due process into a system in which rehabilitation and treatment
were still acknowledged as the most important goals. This is
in marked contrast with the changes toward the legal process model that have taken place in many jurisdictions since
the Gault and Winship decisions. In most states, extensive
efforts have been made to increase the formality of the system but to retain the rehabilitative focus.... In Washington,
treatment and rehabilitation are important objectives insofar
as they might contribute to a reduction in recidivism but
they are not the primary goals and, most importantly, decisions regarding the processing of cases are not to be made in
terms of the treatment needs of the youth.5 5
This profound philosophical change is of major importance
51. State of Washington, Juvenile Disposition Sentencing Standards, Division of

Juvenile Rehabilitation (1985).
52. Id. at Schedule D-2.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(l),(2),(4) (1985).
"'Manifest injustice' means a
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(12) (1985):
disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would
impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of this chapter."
55. Schneider & Schram, supra note 40, at 10.
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when considering the due process rights of a juvenile during
disposition.
III.

SELF-INCRIMINATION IN SENTENCING

Because discretion has traditionally characterized the sentencing hearing, especially in the context of juvenile court, it is
widely recognized to be in the defendant's best interest to fully
cooperate during disposition in the hope of evoking leniency
from the court.5 6 Consequently, the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination when a predisposition psychological evaluation is requested has not been clearly articulated
in statute or in case law.57
The Washington Juvenile Justice Act states that a juvenile
has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages
of the court proceeding,5 8 and that juveniles should be
accorded the same privilege against self-incrimination as
adults.59 In a disposition hearing, the court may receive written and oral reports and rely on them to the extent that they
have probative value.60 The juvenile or the juvenile's counsel
and the prosecuting attorney may examine and controvert
these reports, and cross-examine individuals making reports
when those individuals are reasonably available.6 1 When a psychological evaluation is ordered by the court, the juvenile is
not warned that the report the evaluator submits may be used
to increase the juvenile's sentence beyond the standard
range.6 2 If, as stated in Washington's juvenile code, juveniles
enjoy the same privilege against self-incrimination as adults,
arguably this privilege is compromised by the predisposition
evaluation.
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally
stated that there is no difference between the guilt and penalty
56. Note, Consideration of Defendant Noncooperation: Fifth Amendment
Limitations on Sentencing, 61 B.U.L. REV. 198 (1981).
57. The Washington Supreme Court recently held that WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.100, which requires an adult defendant to disclose prior convictions when a
guilty plea is entered pursuant to a plea agreement, does not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination. The court stated, "The issue of whether the rights against
self-incrimination . . . apply at sentencing is one of first impression for this court."
State v. Ammons, 105 Wash. 2d 175, 713 P.2d 719 (1986).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(2) (1985).
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(8) (1985).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150(1) (1985).
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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phase in a capital murder trial with regard to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.6 " In Estelle v. Smith,
the prosecution for the state of Texas introduced during a capital sentencing proceeding a psychiatrist's testimony regarding
the future dangerousness of the defendant. The psychiatric
exam on which the testimony was based had been ordered by
the court to determine the defendant's competency to stand
trial. The Court ruled that since the defendant had not been
warned that he had the right to remain silent and that statements he made during the competency exam could be used
against him during the capital sentencing proceeding, the
death sentence could not stand.'
The Court in Estelle reaffirmed the principle that the type
of proceeding in which the privilege is invoked is not determinative.6 5 The "nature of the statement or admission and the
exposure which it invites" is the key to the availability of the
privilege.6 6 The Court stated directly that "[a]ny effort by the
State to compel respondent to testify against his will at the
sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment."6 The Estelle ruling strongly suggests that, whether
testifying in court or before an evaluator requested by the
court, a defendant cannot be compelled to testify against his
will.
Two issues in Estelle limit its conclusiveness regarding the
scope of the fifth amendment privilege in a predisposition evaluation. First, Estelle involved a death sentence. Second, it
involved a psychiatric examination ordered for the limited purpose of determining competency to stand trial.
With respect to the death sentence, one might argue that
given the gravity of the outcome, capital sentencing procedures
must be strictly reliable.68 Standards applicable under these
conditions may not directly transfer to less severe circumstances.6 9 The Court does state that "[i]n these distinct circum63. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462-63.
64. Id. at 468.
65. Note, Estelle v. Smitk- Expanding Constitutional Safeguards in Sentencing

Proceedings,9 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 529, 533-34 (1982).
66. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462.
67. Id. at 463.
68. Id. at 468 n.11.

See also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (death is a

different kind of punishment from any other).
69. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4(8) (Tillers rev. 1983) (stating that it now is
reasonably clear that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies in
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. the Fifth Amendment privilege was implicated."7

The Court does not precisely define what "these distinct circumstances" entail. However, the Court relies heavily on cases
that do not involve the death penalty to establish the availability of the privilege in the sentencing phase of the proceeding.7 1
Two Justices, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately in
Estelle to assert their views that the death penalty is unconstitutional.7 2 If, in their view, a death sentence can never constitutionally issue, these Justices most certainly would not
restrict the holding in Estelle to a capital penalty case.
Courts of appeals have relied on Estelle to address the
question of self-incrimination in noncapital sentencing proceedings, but have not definitively resolved the issue. In Jones
v. Cardwell,7 3 the Ninth Circuit found that a confession of
additional criminal activity by a convicted defendant during a
presentence interview with a probation officer violated the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination when the confession was used to enhance the defendant's sentence. This
ruling seems to clearly establish that the privilege applies in
noncapital sentencing proceedings. However, in Baumann v.
United States,4 decided by the Ninth Circuit one month after
Jones, the court narrowly construed Estelle as involving a
bifurcated jury proceeding dealing with the ultimate penalty of
death. The court found a substantial difference between a psychiatric exam seeking to elicit evidence on the critical issue of
dangerousness, as in Estelle, and a routine presentence evaluation with a probation officer, as in Baumann, and declined to
extend the privilege to a routine presentence interview in a
sentencing proceedings, but that it remains to be seen whether Estelle will be applied
in non-capital cases).

70. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466.
71. See e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

(adjudications in juvenile court

proceedings require due process protections); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

(incommunicado interrogation without full warning of constitutional rights violates
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (incriminating testimony of witness who is immune from
state prosecution may not be used for prosecution under federal law); Columbe v.

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (use of confession to first degree murder obtained
through five days of coercive interrogation of a defendant with the mental age of nine
and one-half years violated due process of law).

72. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 474 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Marshall, J., concurring in
all but Part II-C of the opinion, which suggests that the death penalty may be
constitutionally imposed).

73. 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).
74. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
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noncapital proceeding.7 5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that
application of the Estelle holding is not limited to a capital sentencing proceeding.76 In a case factually similar to Estelle but
not involving the death penalty, the Second Circuit court
stated, "[W]e are not persuaded that the Fifth Amendment ruling in Estelle v. Smith is limited to sentencing hearings involving capital punishment. In stating its holding, the Court
emphasized the Fifth Amendment considerations, not the gravity of the particular sentence at issue. '7 7 Although the Second
Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit's narrow construction of Estelle
in Baumann, the court reached a different conclusion. Since
the courts are divided, the full application of Estelle remains
uncertain.
Estelle's ruling is compelling because it involved a capital
sentencing decision. The fifth amendment's protection, however, should not differ according to the severity of punishment.
If the fifth amendment "serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves,"7 "
this principle cannot be logically restricted to a capital sentencing proceeding. Any degree of incapacitation caused by a criminal conviction is a restriction of liberty.
The second issue in Estelle poses a limitation that is more
difficult to resolve: the nature of the psychiatric exam from
which the prohibited testimony was drawn. In Estelle, the
Court states that "[t]he fact that respondent's statements were
uttered in the context of a psychiatric examination does not
automatically remove them from the reach of the Fifth
Amendment. '79 This implies that some psychiatric examinations might be beyond the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. The Court later suggests that if the findings resulted
from a routine competency examination, which was restricted
to ensuring that the defendant understood the charges against
75. Id. at 578.
76. United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
310 (1986) (consideration at sentencing of threats against prosecution made by
defendant during court-ordered psychiatric exam before trial violated defendant's
rights).
77. Id.
78. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466 (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 467).
79. Id. at 465.
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him, the fifth amendment would not apply."0
The privilege against self-incrimination has limitations.
The fifth amendment does not protect evidence that is not
related to a communicative act or used for the testimonial content of what was said."' Therefore, information disclosed in
the course of a routine competency exam is not protected.8 2
Several courts have held that when a defendant introduces
psychiatric evidence to support an insanity defense, he may
also be required to submit to a sanity examination by the prosecution's psychiatrist. This serves to controvert evidence on an
issue the defendant interjects into the case. 3 The Supreme
Court has also held that the privilege against self-incrimination
is not self-executing outside of the "inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed."8 4
The issue is one of defining the context and the nature of a
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample);
see also Note, Requiring a CriminalDefendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 648, 649 (1970).
82. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265(10) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
83. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976)
(psychiatric exams, compelled by the court, are permitted when defendant has raised
insanity defense; statements about the offense itself can be suppressed); Karstetter v.
Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975) (when petitioner indicated intention to present
expert testimony on insanity issue, privilege against self-incrimination did not protect
him from being compelled to talk to state's expert witness); United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (where defendant's insanity has been made an issue in the case,
federal courts have inherent power to order a defendant to submit to examination by a
government psychiatrist. During an examination by a government psychiatrist, it is
impermissible to introduce any statement made by defendant on the issue of guilt.).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the privilege against selfincrimination attaches to statements made by a juvenile to mental health professionals
prior to a hearing on declination of jurisdiction, but once the defendant takes the
stand, the privilege cannot be asserted to prevent the state from using the defendant's
statements to impeach his credibility. State v. Holland, 98 Wash. 2d 507, 656 P.2d 1056
(1983); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982).
84. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 560. It also should be noted that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may be waived. The protection may be knowingly
and intelligently waived with the advice of counsel, or the waiver may be implied. For
example, a defendant who testifies waives the privilege for cross-examination
purposes. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
In addition, a grant of immunity to secure a witness' testimony abrogates the right
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. As long as the immunity is
commensurate with the protection inherent in the fifth amendment, the risk of selfincrimination is eliminated. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); In re Daly, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.
1977).
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psychiatric examination. In Estelle, the Court found that the
psychiatrist who conducted the pretrial competency exam was
essentially acting as an agent of the state. 85 "During the psychiatric evaluation, respondent assuredly was 'faced with a
phase of the adversary system' and was 'not in the presence of
[a] perso[n] acting solely in his interest.' "86 The defendant was
given no warning that statements he made during the competency exam might be used to decide whether he should be sen8 7
tenced to death, if convicted.
Jones v. Cardwell8 and Baumann v. United States8 9 may
be distinguished by the nature and context of the interviews.
In Jones, the defendant was instructed that he was present
under court order and it was imperative that he answer all
questions asked of him by the probation officer.' He was not
warned that his answers could be used to enhance his sentence. The court found that under these circumstances the
defendant's confession was involuntary and could not be used
against him.91 In Baumann, the court based its holding on the
fact that nothing in the record indicated that the presentence
interview involved the inherently coercive pressures intrinsic
in the policy of the Miranda decision or presented by the facts
in Estelle.92 In Jones, the court found that coercive pressures
were present in the interview, but in Baumann it found that
they were not.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a juvenile is
not constitutionally entitled to a Miranda-type warning prior
to a court-ordered predisposition psychological evaluation. 93
The court summarily dismissed the defendant's fifth amendment claim by relying on the Baumann court's narrow interpretation of Estelle as limited to its unique facts.9 4 The court
did not address United States v. Chitty, decided six months earlier by the Second Circuit, in which the federal court specifically held that Estelle was not limited to sentencing hearings
85. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467.
86. Id. (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 469).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).
692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
Jones, 686 F.2d at 757.
Id.
Baumann, 692 F.2d at 576-77.
Matter of Jose D., 66 N.Y.2d 638, 485 N.E.2d 1025 (1985).

94. Id. at 640, 485 N.E.2d at 1027.
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involving capital punishment.9 5
In a New York lower court decision consistently cited by
the New York Court of Appeals, a juvenile's fifth amendment
claim was also denied.9 6 This court similarly relied on Baumann's narrow reading of Estelle to dispose of the fifth amendment claim.9 7 However, in its analysis of the defendant's sixth
amendment claim for representation of counsel during the predisposition evaluation, the court carefully distinguished the
purposes of the juvenile court disposition from a criminal sentencing proceeding. 8 In concluding that the juvenile was not
constitutionally entitled to counsel's participation in the predisposition evaluation, the court was influenced by the
nonadversarial nature of the report and the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court.9 9 For the New York court, the
nature and the context of the proceeding was determinative to
its holding.
The nature and context of the hearing in which a predisposition evaluation is sought is equally significant to the conclusion in this Comment. In Washington, however, the report
is generated through inherently coercive techniques and the
disposition hearing is often adversarial." °
It is difficult to imagine a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation used in any phase of a criminal proceeding that does not
implicate the fifth amendment protection when the defendant
has neither interjected the mental health issue nor knowingly
waived the privilege against self-incrimination. The nature of
a psychiatric examination is to impinge on the inviolability of
the personality, exposing and analyzing its innermost
aspects.' 01 This certainly implicates the value of an individual's right to a "private enclave," which the privilege is
designed to protect. 10 2 The examination is conducted in private
and it involves convincing the defendant that full disclosure is
beneficial when, in fact, the consequences may be contrary to
the defendant's own view of his best interests. 10 3 These condi95. Chitty, 760 F.2d at 432.

96. Matter of Steven E.H., 124 Misc. 2d 385, 477 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1984).
97. Id. at 390, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
98. Id. at 388-89, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 565.

99. Id.
100. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
101. Note, supra note 81, at 658.
102. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
103. Note, supra note 81, at 659.
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tions differ little from the atmosphere of psychological coercion that concerned the Court in Miranda.'" In addition,
psychiatric reports may be unreliable because of the interpretive nature of diagnosis, but the presence of such a report
allows the state to refrain from seeking independent evidence
of the conclusions drawn in the report.1 05 This concern is akin
to the court's general distrust of self-deprecatory statements.0 6
Confessions are not sufficient without external corroboration. 10 7 And yet, the report of an evaluator on the defendant's
mental state or amenability to treatment may specifically be
used to determine sentence length.
While it can be argued that any mental examination used
in a criminal proceeding infringes on the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, 0 8 this position has not
been established by the courts.0 9 In a footnote, the Court in
Estelle further limits, and obscures, its holding by stating that
the same fifth amendment concerns addressed in the case are
not "necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied on to inform a sentencing determination."" 0 Presumably, when the information
is being sought for punishment purposes,"' and is procured
104. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-54 (incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere; tactics designed to put subject in psychological state of
merely elaborating on what police purport to know-that he is guilty; pointing out to
the subject the incriminating significance of a refusal to talk).
105. Note, supra note 81, at 660; see also, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972) (sentencing based on evidence of prior invalid convictions, remanded for
reconsideration); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing based on invalid
assumptions from defendant's criminal record). These cases stand for the proposition
that there is a due process right to be sentenced only on accurate information.
106. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 55-56 (greatest care must be taken to assure not only
that an admission was not coerced, but also that it was not the product of adolescent
fantasy, fright or despair); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 (psychological problems of typical
defendant make him susceptible to coercion).
107. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(8) (1985) (an extrajudicial confession is
insufficient to find guilt unless objective evidence is first independently established).
108. Wesson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment
Proceedings,1980 WIs. L. REV. 697, 714-16.
109. See, e.g., Note, supra note 80, at 650, n.18-20; United States v. Jones, 640 F.2d
284 (10th Cir. 1981) (incriminating statements made during an involuntary presentence
psychological evaluation could not be used to determine guilt but could be used to
assess mental status at the time of sentencing).
110. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469, n.13.
111. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2988 (1986) (proceedings under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are not "criminal" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment guarantee because the Act serves the purpose of treating those committed
under its authority); Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination is still relevant after guilt has been determined); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
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under coercive conditions," 2 the privilege would apply.
The rehabilitative model of sentencing supports the premise that it is in the defendant's best interest to cooperate with
the court in sentencing. The defendant can thereby supply the
court with information needed to tailor the individualized sentence while demonstrating appropriate contrition and readiness to change. The line between cooperation and selfincrimination is hazy at best." 3 Washington's Juvenile Justice
Act, on the other hand, is based on a justice model. Under
these specific conditions, the availability of the privilege
against self-incrimination must be independently analyzed.
IV.

APPLICATION TO WASHINGTON'S JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT

The unique nature of the juvenile code in Washington is a
critical element in the present analysis. The majority of cases
use an individualized model of sentencing to establish procedural safeguards." 4 However, the Washington juvenile code is
based on a "just deserts" model that seeks accountability, uniformity, proportionality, and fairness in the juvenile court proceeding. 1 5 One purpose of the code is to provide punishment
commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the
juvenile offender." 6 If these are the only significant factors in
the sentencing decision, then there is no need for a predisposition psychological evaluation."'
However, the Washington
Supreme Court has consistently held that the legislature did
not intend to eliminate entirely the traditional rehabilitation
49 (1967) ("juvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency'... must be regarded as
'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination").
112. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (because respondent revealed
incriminating information to his probation officer instead of asserting his fifth
amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 727-28 (1979) (juvenile's request to talk with his probation officer was not a per se
invocation of fifth amendment rights and, based on the totality of the circumstances,
his subsequent statements were not coerced).
113. Note, supra note 56, at 209-213.
114. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1948); D. BOERNER, supra note 18, § 3.7 at 3-13.
115. Schneider & Schram, supra note 40, at 10; see supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)(d) (1985).
117. This is not to suggest that an offender could not waive the privilege or
participate in a predisposition evaluation if it could be used to introduce mitigating
factors that the offender would like the court to consider. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.150(n)(3) provides that evidence tending to show the respondent was suffering
from a mental or physical condition that reduced culpability may be considered as a
mitigating factor.
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role of the juvenile court. 118 In the opinion of the court, "the
[Juvenile Justice Act] has not utterly abandoned the rehabilitative ideal which impelled the juvenile justice system for
decades. It does not embrace a purely punitive or retributive
philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equatorial line
somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and
retribution.""' 9 The court has used several sections of the juvenile code to support this rationale. 20
Even if the Juvenile Justice Act does not fully eliminate
treatment considerations, the question of self-incrimination
during a predisposition evaluation has not been satisfactorily
resolved. Good intentions do not extinguish constitutionally
12 1
protected rights.
The court has relied on three sections of the juvenile
code 122 to justify the distinct handling of juvenile offenders.
Arguably, these sections remove predisposition psychological
evaluations from the protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment. These sections are: (1) the rehabilitative objectives of
the juvenile court; (2) the court's authority to receive relevant
evidence during sentencing; and (3) the manifest injustice provision. Each section will be discussed separately.
A.

Treatment as a DeclaredPurpose of the
Juvenile Justice Act

The stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act is as
follows:
118. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982); In re Smiley, 96
Wash. 2d 950, 640 P.2d 7 (1982); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 571 P.2d 772 (1979).
119. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 393, 655 P.2d at 1150-51.
120. See, e.g., Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 393, 655 P.2d at 1150 (citing WASH. REV. CODE

§ 13.40.010(2)(f) and (j) relating to stated purposes of the juvenile code); Lawley, 91
Wash. 2d at 657, 571 P.2d at 773 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150 relating to
information which may be received at a disposition hearing; WASH. REV. CODE
§ § 13.40.020(12), .160 relating to the use of manifest injustice).

121. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 ("We made it clear in [Gault] that civil labels
and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile court."); Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 ("[U]nbridled discretion, however

benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.");
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) ("(C]ommitment proceedings whether
denominated civil or criminal are subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment ... and to the Due Process Clause."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444 ("[P]rosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.").
122. See supra note 120.
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[I]t shall be the purpose of this chapter to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have
committed offenses as defined by this chapter;
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her
criminal behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age,
crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender;
(e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an offense;
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody
for juvenile offenders;
(g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities whenever consistent with public safety;
(h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i)Develop effective standards and goals for the operation,
funding, and evaluation of all components of the juvenile
justice system and related services at the state and local
levels; and
(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of
offenders shall receive punishment, treatment or both, and
to determine the jurisdictional limitations
of the courts,
123
institutions, and community services.
Of the ten purposes listed, treatment is mentioned as one of
several objectives in the sixth and tenth statements on the list.
Protecting the public, accountability, or punishment are objectives that are reflected in each of the ten stated purposes.
By contrast, the purpose and scope of the juvenile code
prior to the 1977 enactment stated that the "Juvenile Court
Law ... appl[ies] to all minor children under the age of eighteen years who are delinquent or dependent.' 1 24 Twelve definitions of "dependent child" were listed,125 and a "delinquent
child" was defined as anyone under age eighteen who violated
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1985).
124. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 302(1) at 2474 (repealed 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 291 (81) at
1041).
125. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 302(1) at 2472-75:
(1) Who has no home or any settled place of abode, or any proper
guardianship, or any visible means of subsistence; or
(2) Who has no parent, guardian or other responsible person; or who has no
parent or guardian willing to exercise, or capable of exercising, proper
parental control; or
(3) Whose home by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity of his parents or
either of them, or on the part of his guardian, or on the part of the person in
whose custody or care he may be, or for any other reason, is an unfit place for
such child; or
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any law or ordinance. 2 6 If a child was found to be delinquent
or dependent within the meaning of the juvenile code, the
court could make any order "for the care, custody, or commitment of the child as the child's welfare in the interest of the
state require[d].' 2 7 In comparison, the statutory statement of
purpose in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 demonstrates that
rehabilitation is not a dominant theme.
This limited role of rehabilitation, however, is consistent
with a privilege against self-incrimination during sentencing.
Under an "inquiry broad in scope" that characterizes the rehabilitative model of sentencing, 128 the privilege against self129
incrimination has been applied to the sentencing proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit court stated in Jones v. Cardwell that "[a]
sentencing judge's broad discretion to consider information in
imposing sentence does not extend to consideration of information obtained in violation of a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination .... To hold otherwise would undercut seriously the protection afforded a defendant by the privilege."'' °
The United States Supreme Court's latest decision regarding the fifth amendment, Allen v. Illinois," is instructive. In
Allen the majority found that an individual was not constitu(4) Who frequents the company of reputed criminals, vagrants or prostitutes;
or

(5) Who is found living or being in any house of prostitution or assignation; or
(6) Who habitually visits any saloon, or place where spiritous, vinous, or malt
liquors are consumed or sold, bartered, or given away; or
(7) Who is incorrigible; that is who is beyond the control and power of his
parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of the conduct or nature of said
child; or
(8) Who is in danger of being brought up to lead an idle, dissolute or immoral
life; or
(9)

Who is a habitual truant, as defined in the school laws of the state of

Washington; or
(10) Who uses intoxicating liquor as a beverage, or who uses opium, cocaine,
morphine, heroin, or marijuana, or other similar drug, without the direction
of a competent physician; or

(11)

Who wanders about in the nighttime without being on any lawful

business or occupation; or

(12) Who is grossly and wilfully neglected as to medical care necessary for his
well-being.
126. Id.
127. 1961 Wash. Laws ch. 302(6) at 2478 (repealed 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 291(81) at

1041).
128. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 556; see supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
129. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463; Chitty, 760 F.2d at 432; Jones, 686 F.2d at 756; but see
Baumann, 692 F.2d at 576; see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.

130. Jones, 686 F.2d at 756.
131. 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986) (5-4 decision).
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tionally protected from self-incrimination in a proceeding
under Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act because the
proceeding was not "criminal" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment.'3 2 The Court rested firmly on the nonpunitive
nature of the Act, stating that "the State has disavowed any
interest in punishment.' ' 33 When a person committed under
the Act shows that he is no longer dangerous, he is
discharged. 1"
In comparison, Washington's juvenile code clearly has a
punitive purpose even if, as the courts have found, a rehabilitative purpose is retained. Juvenile offenders are released from
their sentences when the prescribed terms expire. 3 5 No show
ing is required from the juvenile or the State that rehabilitation has occurred.
Recognizing the civil denomination of juvenile court proceedings, the Allen court rather curtly distinguished Gault by
stating that "[t]he Court in Gault was obviously persuaded that
the State intended to punish its juvenile offenders.' 1 3 ' This,
however, is not the principle for which Gault stands. Gault did
not repudiate treatment as a valid objective of juvenile court.
Gault held that in spite of the benevolent motives of rehabilitation, juveniles were entitled to constitutional protections
during a delinquency adjudication. 37 To reconcile these holdings, one must deduce that a sanction that is imposed as the
result of a "criminal" prosecution and includes a rehabilitative
aspect is not comparable to a purely treatment oriented commitment like the one in Allen. As reasoned by the court in
Jones v. Cardwell, broad discretion on the part of the judge to
tailor a sentence to the whole person does not justify violation
of a constitutional protection. 38
Washington's Juvenile Justice Act distinctly moves away
from a rehabilitation model toward one emphasizing accountability and punishment. 39 Juveniles sentenced under an
132. Id. at 2995-96.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 2996-97.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.210 (1985).

Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2993-94 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (citation
omitted).
137. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-21; see supra note 121. It should be noted that both
Allen and Gault deal with the adjudicative stage of their respective proceedings, not
disposition. Neither case, therefore, has precedential force regarding sentencing.
138. Jones, 686 F.2d at 756; see supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.

Juvenile Self-Incrimination

19861

accountability model should not enjoy fewer protections than
adults sentenced under a rehabilitation model. Recognizing
rehabilitation as a shared purpose of the juvenile code does not
mean that the objectives of just consequences and accountability can be abandoned. A justice model should provide greater
protections during sentencing because the scope
of the sentenc140
ing inquiry has been significantly narrowed.
The legislature created the Juvenile Disposition Standards
Commission to develop disposition standards that implement
the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act.1 41 In its guide, the
Standards Commission states that the first priority in sentencing under the Juvenile Justice Act is justice and accountability. 142 The type and level of sanctions an offender receives
should be proportional to the juvenile's current and past
offense behavior. 4 3 Sanctions should not be based on the
youth's treatment needs. 44 The Standards Commission
encourages the use of offense-specific treatment and educational services for juvenile offenders, acknowledging as the
court has, that treatment remains a component of the Youth
Justice Model.14

'

The Commission stresses, however, that the

need for treatment services should not influence the severity
of a youth's sentence. 46 "Educational and treatment services
should be considered only after fairly determined sanctions
have been developed.'

47

It is the role of the juvenile court to put teeth into the justice model of sentencing. Yet implicit in the request for a predisposition psychological evaluation is a tailoring of the
sentence to fit the personality of the offender rather than fixing a punishment "commensurate with the age, crime, and
criminal history of the juvenile offender.'

1 48

Courts presume

that it is through individualized sentencing that the rehabilitative needs of the offender will be addressed.149 It is possible,
140. See, D. BOERNER, supra note 18, § 3.7 at 3, 16-17.
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.040.025-.027 (1985).
142. WASHINGTON STATE JUVENILE DISPOSITION

STANDARDS

COMMISSION,

JUVENILE DISPOSITION STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDE, 9 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY].

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.

148. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)(d) (1985).

149. See Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 397, 655 P.2d at 1152 ("[lIt is inimical to the
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however, to address treatment needs within penalties fixed by
the severity of the crime or the danger the youth presents.
Counseling or educational activities may be incorporated into
any community supervision order." ° For juveniles committed
to an institution for a term of confinement, educational and
treatment services are part of each offender's individualized
case plan.1 5 ' After the offender's release from sentence, these
services may also be provided during a term of up to eighteen
months of parole supervision.5 2
If treatment is a substantive part of most disposition
orders, then the treatment needs of juvenile offenders are
being addressed by virtue of the adjudication. The component
parts of the juvenile system consider these needs within the
justice framework. It is the court's role to maintain the integrity of the system by responding to juvenile offenders with uniformity, equity, fairness, and accountability. 1 53 Additional
tailoring of a sentence on the part of the judge is not necessary
to serve treatment objectives.
To grant that the privilege against self-incrimination
applies during a predisposition psychological evaluation does
not eliminate treatment considerations from the juvenile justice structure. The Estelle court held that an individual could
not be the "deluded instrument" of his own punishment. 1
Jones 155 and Chitty15 6 also recognized the privilege against selfincrimination during disposition under a rehabilitation model
of sentencing. Washington courts, operating under a justice
theory of sentencing, acknowledge that juveniles share the
same privilege against self-incrimination as adults.5 7 At a
minimum, juveniles in Washington should be warned that
what they say in a predisposition evaluation may be used to
increase their sentence.
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system .. .[to] destroy the flexibility ...
[of the court] .. .to fit the disposition to the offender, rather than to the offense.").
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(3) (1985).
151. Dep't of Social and Health Serv., Div. of Juvenile Rehabilitation, OffenseSpecific Case Management Bulletin 4 (1985).
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.210(3) (1985).
153. Schneider & Schram, supra note 40, at 3; see supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
154. Estelle, 481 U.S. at 462.
155. 686 F.2d at 756.
156. 760 F.2d at 432.
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140(8) (1985).
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B. Authority to Receive All Relevant Evidence During
Disposition
To buttress its finding that "the legislature did not intend
to accuse, treat, and sentence juveniles the same as adult
offenders,11 5 8 the Washington Supreme Court has relied on the
provision in the juvenile code that allows the court to receive
during the disposition hearing "all relevant and material evidence, including (1) recommendations from the prosecutor and
counsel for the juvenile, (2) information and arguments
offered by the parties and their counsel, (3) predisposition
reports, and (4) statements from the juvenile and his or her
parent, guardian or custodian."1'59 One might conclude that if
the court can rely on relevant predisposition reports, the psychological evaluation on which such a report is based must a
fortiori be permissible. 6 ° Such an inference sweeps too
broadly.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the fifth
amendment privilege applies to statements made to a courtappointed mental health professional prior to a decline hearing. 161 A decline hearing is a preliminary proceeding to decide
if the defendant will be tried in juvenile court or transferred to
adult court for prosecution.162 The purpose is to determine if
the public could be better protected or the juvenile better
served by adjudication in adult court. 1 63 The court shall consider in the hearing relevant reports, facts, opinions, and arguments presented by the parties to assist in the
158. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d at 656, 591 P.2d at 773.
159. Id. at 657, 591 P.2d at 773 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150).
160. This argument is similar to the one made in In re Steven E.H., supra note 96.

In that case, the New York court relied on the nonadversarial nature of the diagnostic
study and the essentially rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court to deny the
juvenile representation of counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination during
the predisposition evaluation. New York's juvenile code has a more rehabilitative
purpose than does Washington's code. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 301.1 (McKinney

1983). At the disposition hearing, the N.Y. court must make a finding that the juvenile
is in

need of supervision, treatment, or confinement. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT

§ 351.1(1),(2). The need for any one of these three responses will suffice to permit
sentencing once guilt for the underlying crime has been determined.
161. State v. Holland, 98 Wash. 2d 507, 519, 656 P.2d 1056, 1063 (1983); State v.
Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 20, 653 P.2d 1024, 1033 (1982).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.110 (1985) (if transferred to adult court, juvenile
court has "declined" jurisdiction. Once juvenile court jurisdiction has been declined,
the individual is thereafter tried as an adult.).

163. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (waiver of jurisdiction is a
critically important determination and should be the exception rather than the rule).
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determination."M Washington courts characterize the decline
hearing as nonadversarial in nature because neither confinement nor punishment can directly result from the
16 5

proceeding.

However, nonadversarial hearings do not necessarily
extinguish the fifth amendment privilege. In State v. Holland,
a sixteen year old boy appealed his conviction in adult court
for second-degree murder and second-degree rape.
One of
the errors asserted by Holland on appeal was that statements
he made to mental health professionals prior to the decline
hearing had been improperly admitted at trial.'6 7 The court
found that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination precludes
the use of defendant's statements [to court-appointed mental
health professionals prior to the decline hearing] unless the
privilege was knowingly and intelligently waived .... ,168 The
court recognized that statements made during a court-ordered
psychological examination were protected by the fifth amendment. The fact that the evaluation was ordered for a
nonadversarial hearing in which all relevant information could
be received did not extinguish the privilege.
The principle in the disposition hearing is identical to that
in decline hearings, but the risks are greater: confinement or
punishment directly results. If the privilege against selfincrimination applies to statements made to court-appointed
mental health professionals prior to a nonadversarial hearing
in which the court may receive all relevant information, then
the privilege must also apply when the defendant's liberty is
directly at stake. In both instances the juvenile code permits
the court to receive all relevant reports. 69 Prior to a decline
hearing the juvenile must be warned that his statements may
later be used at trial to incriminate him. 170 Yet, in a disposition hearing, a defendant's statements may also be used to justify additional sanctions. In both cases the defendant, through
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.110(2) (1985).
165. State v. Whittington, 27 Wash. App. 422, 428, 618 P.2d 121, 125 (1980) (citing

In re Harbert, 85 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 538 P.2d 1212, 1216 (1975)).
166. Holland, 98 Wash. 2d at 508, 656 P.2d at 1057.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 519, 656 P.2d at 1063 (the court went on to hold that since the
statements made to the mental health professionals were introduced only after the
defendant took the stand, the fifth amendment privilege could not be asserted to
prevent the State from impeaching the defendant's credibility).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § § 13.40.110(2), .150 (1985).

170. Holland, 98 Wash. 2d at 519, 656 P.2d at 1063.
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the court-ordered evaluation, is at risk of self-incrimination.
The fact that the statute allows the court to receive the report
does not reduce this risk.
One can argue that the reason the court is permitted to
receive all relevant information during disposition, even evidence that is not receivable at trial, is to allow the admission of
hearsay. The typical presentence report submitted by a probation officer is rife with hearsay. 171 It would place an undue
burden on the court to prove by direct examination all information contained in a presentence report. 172 The Washington
Court Rules, therefore, exempt both adult and juvenile disposition hearings from the Rules of Evidence to ease the court's
17 3

burden.

However, allowing hearsay evidence at a disposition hearing, where the defendant can counteract the hearsay with evidence of his own, is very different from violating an
individual's constitutional right to be protected from incriminating himself. The court has recognized the privilege against
self-incrimination in a compelled psychological evaluation held
prior to a nonadversarial hearing. 7 4 A court-ordered predisposition evaluation in which the defendant's liberty interest is
directly implicated closely resembles the "inherently coercive
custodial interrogation"1 75 for which the privilege was
designed. A defendant is encouraged to freely disclose potentially damaging information when, in fact, he may thereby
expose himself to a longer sentence. In this setting, the protection against self-incrimination must be equally available.
C. The Manifest Injustice Determination
The manifest injustice provision in the juvenile code is
often relied on by the court to justify handling juvenile offenders differently than adults. Under this provision the court may
depart from the standard sentence determined by the sentencing guidelines if that disposition would "impose an excessive
penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious, and clear
171. See, e.g., 8A J.

MooRE, W. TAGGERT &

J.

PRACTICE 32.03[3] (2d ed. 1981).
172. Williams, 337 U.S. at 249-50.
173. WASH. CT. R. EvID. 1101(c)(3).
174. Holland,98 Wash. 2d at 509, 656 P.2d at 1057.
175. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 560.

WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
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danger to society in light of the purposes of the act.' 76 If this
option is used, the court must record its reasons for concluding
that the standard sentence would impose a "manifest injustice," and these findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 7 7 The manifest injustice provision does
allow for individualized sentencing, but reliance on this provision is misplaced if it is used to infer a lower standard for constitutional protections.
The Washington Court of Appeals has held that "[a] disposition hearing at which a manifest injustice is sought is clearly
an adversary proceeding, since it can result in the imposition of
a higher sentence, including incarceration, than would otherwise be permissible.' 17 ' The courts have also found that the
clear and convincing standard of proof required by statute in a
manifest injustice hearing is the civil counterpart to the standard beyond a reasonable doubt. 79 This highest standard of
proof and the adversarial nature of the manifest injustice disposition attest to the significance of the risk to which the
offender is exposed.
As an adversarial proceeding, the manifest injustice determination certainly falls within the ambit of the fifth amendment's protection. The State is seeking to show that the
presumptive sentence would not adequately protect society
from the juvenile. The court orders the defendant to undergo
a psychological evaluation so that the evaluator can draw conclusions about the juvenile's continuing threat to the public.
The information the juvenile shares in response to the evaluator's questions exposes him to an enhanced sentence now left
largely to the judge's discretion. ° This situation differs little
from the additional punishment to which the defendants were
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(12) (1985); see Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 394-95, 655

P.2d at 1151; Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d at 657, 591 P.2d at 773.
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160 (1985).

178. Whittington, 27 Wash. App. 422, 428-29, 618 P.2d 121, 125 (1980); see also State
v. Murphy, 35 Wash. App. 658, 669 P.2d 891 (1985).
179. State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d 755, 760, 600 P.2d 1264, 1267 (1979); State v. P., 37
Wash. App. 773, 778, 686 P.2d 488, 491 (1984); State v. Gutierrez, 37 Wash. App. 910,
915, 684 P.2d 887, 890 (1983).
180. State v. P., 37 Wash. App. at 775-78, 686 P.2d at 490-91; see also State v.

Strong, 23 Wash. App. 789, 599 P.2d 20 (1979). To be upheld on review, a disposition
outside of the standard range must meet a three-part test: 1) reasons given by the trial

court must be supported by the record; 2) reasons given must clearly and convincingly
support the disposition; and 3) the disposition cannot be too excessive or too lenient.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.230(2) (1985); Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d at 760, 600 P.2d at 1267;

State v. P., 37 Wash. App. at 776, 686 P.2d at 491.
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18 2
exposed in Jones v. Cardwell 8 ' and United States v. Chitty.
When imposing a sentence under the manifest injustice
provision, the court may consider the presence of aggravating
factors specified in the statute1 83 and the stated purposes of the
Juvenile Justice Act.'8 4 The court most often cites the juvenile
code purposes of community safety and provision of necessary
treatment to support a finding that the offender is a "serious

and clear danger to society.'

1 85

Community safety is a major concern under the Juvenile
Justice Act, 8 6 but the predisposition evaluation may be a dubious aid in promoting public safety under the manifest injustice
provision. There is an inherent tendency to overpredict when
forecasting dangerousness.1 8 7 The Juvenile Disposition Standards Commission states that the most accurate predictors of
future offenses are the severity, recency, and number of prior
offenses.18 8 A psychological evaluation is not needed to identify these factors. If the evaluation is used anyway, fairness is
sacrificed to formality. If the Commission's assertion is incorrect and additional psychological material is needed from the
offender to determine the risk he poses to public safety, then
certainly the offender is being asked to contribute information
that may be used to extend his term of incarceration. In this
circumstance the fifth amendment privilege should be available or knowingly waived by the defendant.
The provision of treatment justification relied on by the
court is equally problematic. As discussed in section IV.A, one
can argue that any treatment objective retained in Washington's juvenile code should not dictate sentence length. The
express language of the statute emphasizes accountability, public safety, and punishment.8 9 The offender's race, sex, and
social needs, and the community's lack of treatment facilities
181. 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
182. 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 310 (1986); see supra notes
73-77 and accompanying text.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150(3)(i) (1985).

184. Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d at 760, 600 P.2d at 1267; State v. P., 37 Wash. App. at 778,
686 P.2d at 491; see also In re Luft, 21 Wash. App. 841, 589 P.2d 314 (1979).
185. See Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 396-97, 655 P.2d at 1152-53; Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d at
760, 600 P.2d at 1267; State v. P., 37 Wash. App. at 778, 686 P.2d at 491; Luft, 21 Wash.
App. at 854, 589 P.2d at 321.
186. STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY, Supra note 142, at 11.
187. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 20-21.
188. STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY, supra note 142, at 11; see also D. GOTTFREDSON,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1967).
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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are specifically prohibited from consideration when determining the punishment to be imposed. 190 The Juvenile Disposition
Sentencing Commission also rejects the use of sentence length
to procure treatment services.' 9' Release is not conditioned on
successful rehabilitation 92 and, importantly, there is no guarantee anywhere in the system that rehabilitation can be
achieved even if the maximum sentence possible is imposed.' 93
The vagaries of psychological diagnosis and treatment and the
Juvenile Justice Act's strong emphasis on just deserts should
substantially undermine the force of a treatment justification
when a fundamental constitutional protection is at issue.
The due process protections recognized as important during a manifest injustice hearing also suggest applicability of the
fifth amendment's protection during a predisposition evaluation. In State v. Whittington, 94 the Washington Court of
Appeals analogized a manifest injustice finding to other
enhanced sentencing schemes and found that the highest standards of due process applied.' 95 The court relied primarily on
Specht v. Patterson,9 6 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the full panoply of due process guarantees
were required when an offender was sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act after having been convicted of a sex
crime.'9 7 Under Colorado law, the Sex Offenders Act could be
brought into play if the trial court found that a person convicted of a sex crime constituted a threat to the public.198
Rather than receiving the maximum penalty of ten years'
imprisonment carried by the offense, the offender could be
exposed to an indeterminate sentence of up to life in prison.' 99
The Court held that a new finding of fact, in this instance the
threat of bodily harm to the public, which was not an ingredient of the underlying crime, entitled the defendant to "all
these safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential to
190.
191.
192.
193.

WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150(4) (1985).
STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY, supra note 142, at 15.
See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 11-18; STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY, supra

note 142, at 14-15.
194. 27 Wash. App. 422, 618 P.2d 121 (1980).
195. Id. at 425-26, 618 P.2d at 123-24.
196. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
197. Id. at 609-10.
198. Id. at 607 (the Sex Offenders Act also applied if the defendant was found to

be a habitual offender and mentally ill).
199. Id.
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a fair trial, including the right
to confront and cross-examine
200
the witnesses against him.

Washington courts have long held that facts that will
enhance a defendant's sentence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 1 The Whittington court compared the manifest injustice finding in juvenile court to Washington's adult
deadly weapon sentence enhancement 20 2 and the habitual
offender judgment. 0 3 It has been argued that the essential element needed to invoke the full panoply of due process protections during sentence enhancement is a finding of fact that
changes the defendant's status, thereby exposing him to
greater punishment than would otherwise be permissible. °4
This is precisely the risk to which a juvenile offender is
exposed when a finding of manifest injustice is sought. Without a finding by the court that the standard sentence will
impose a serious and clear danger to the community, the court
is required to impose the standard sentence. With a finding of
manifest injustice, the court may enhance the maximum penalty the juvenile receives.20 5
200. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d
Cir. 1966)) (emphasis added).
201. See State v. Tongate, 93 Wash. 2d 751, 613 P.2d 121 (1980) (presence of a
deadly weapon must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt for penalty enhancement
under the deadly weapon statute); State v. Murdock, 91 Wash. 2d 336, 588 P.2d 1143
(1979) (burden on the State to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt in a
habitual criminal proceeding); State v. Frazier, 81 Wash. 2d 628, 503 P.2d 1073 (1972)
(enhanced penalty under the deadly weapon statute requires the highest standards of
due process); State v. Tatum, 61 Wash. 2d 576, 379 P.2d 372 (1963) (determination of
habitual criminal status invokes full panoply of procedural protections).
202. Whittington, 27 Wash. App. at 425, 618 P.2d at 123 (citing State v. Frazier, 81
Wash. 2d 628, 503 P.2d 1073 (1972)).
203. Id. (citing State v. Tatum, 61 Wash. 2d 576, 379 P.2d 372 (1963)).
204. D. BOERNER, supra note 18, § 3.11 at 3-26. Professor Boerner argues that the
application of highest order of due process protections to a finding under the firearm
or deadly weapon statutes is not constitutionally required because the defendant's
status is not essentially changed. These provisions impose a mandatory minimum
sentence, unlike the habitual offender statute, which exposes the offender to an
enhanced maximum penalty. It is exposure to an increased maximum sentence that
alters a person's status, not the mandatory imposition of a minimum sentence. The
Washington courts failed to recognize this distinction.
The distinction that Professor Boerner raises does not affect the analysis in this
Comment however since a finding of manifest injustice alters the defendant's status
and exposes him to an enhanced maximum sentence.
205. A juvenile cannot be sentenced to a term of confinement beyond that to
which an adult could be sentenced for the same offense. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.160(7) (1985).
The continuing vitality of Whittington has been questioned in dictum by the
Court of Appeals in State v. Beard, 39 Wash. App. 601, 606, 694 P.2d 692, 695 (1985).
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The Whittington court recognized that a finding of manifest injustice in juvenile court was indistinguishable from the
determination in Specht that the defendant presented a threat
of bodily harm to members of the public.20 6 Specht expressly
imposed on sentencing hearings under the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act the right to be represented by counsel, the right
to have an opportunity to be heard, the right to confront and
20 7
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to offer evidence.
But the safeguards at such a hearing need not be limited to
these rights. Specht stands for the proposition that the essential protections fundamental to a fair trial must be present in a
hearing in which a new finding of fact exposes a defendant to
an enhanced sentence. 0
Responding to a similar due process argument, the Court
in Allen v. Illinois stated that "[t]his Court has never held that
the due process clause of its own force requires application of
the privilege against self-incrimination in a noncriminal proceeding, where the privilege claimant is protected against his
compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case [,and w]e
decline to do so today. ' 2 9 The Court recognized the incriminating nature of the compelled statements, but concluded that
the privilege had no place among the due process safeguards
designed to enhance the reliability of a fact-finding
determination.°
Reliability of confessions is, however, cited as one of the
values protected by the fifth amendment.2 1 1 In Gault, the
The court refers to the different purposes behind the juvenile code and the adult
sentence enhancement statutes as a basis for its concern, but does not develop this
analysis. A different purpose, even if conceded, would not diminish the strength of the
analogy as it pertains to constitutional protections. These protections have been

accorded juveniles by virtue of Winship, Rhodes, and WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160
(1985).
206. Whittington, 27 Wash. App. at 426, 618 P.2d at 124.
207. Specht, 386 U.S. at 610.
208. Id. at 609-10. Allen v. Illinois does not preclude this assertion. In Specht the
Court equates the Colorado Sex Offenders Act with a criminal proceeding leading to
criminal punishment. Specht, 386 U.S. at 610. The Court distinguished Colorado's Act
from one in Minnesota that was not criminal in nature, thereby not triggering the
same range of due process protections. Id. at 610-11 n.3. Allen does not refer to Specht
and rests squarely on the nonpunitive nature of Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text. The Allen Court also held that if
the defendant had shown that he would be subjected to a regimen identical to one
imposed for punishment, the outcome of the case could be different.

209. Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2995-6.
210. Id.
211. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251(2) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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Court discussed at some length the lack of reliability in confessions by juveniles.2 1 2 After holding that the privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable to juveniles, the Court stated
that if "an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it
was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."213

Moreover, fundamental fairness has been described as the
cornerstone of due process.21 4 The Supreme Court has held
that "a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental
and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment,"2 5 and that the fifth amendment privilege is an essential mainstay of the American system
of criminal prosecution.21 6 Without doubt, the State has a
legitimate interest in protecting the public and tending to the
welfare of its juveniles. But on balance, fundamental fairness
should require recognition of the fifth amendment's protection
prior to a predisposition evaluation, especially where, as here,
the probative value of the resulting report is questionable.21 7
Predisposition psychological evaluations do lead to longer
sentences. A study conducted by the Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) in 1982 on
the use of manifest injustice in juvenile court sentencing
showed that the presentence evaluation does affect the sentencing decision. 2 .. The purpose of this study was to identify
factors that related to the use of the manifest injustice provision. Four target jurisdictions in Washington were studied.2 1 9
Judges in these courts were interviewed and 365 randomly
selected cases were reviewed. 220 Seven categories of variables
were statistically analyzed to determine which factors significantly influenced the decision to use manifest injustice to
212. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47, 52-56.
213. Id. at 55.

214. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
215. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1964) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1962)).
216. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7.
217. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussion of the balancing test
central to a due process analysis); see supra p. 105-07.
218. DoYON, FACTORS RELATED TO THE USE OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE IN JUVENILE
COURT SENTENCING, Dep't of Social and Health Services, State of Washington (1982).
219. Id. at 7 (Benton-Franklin, Clark, Pierce, and Spokane County courts).

220. Id.
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increase an offender's sentence.2 2 1 The presence of a predisposition evaluation was a prominent factor.
DSHS determined that for the youths without sufficient
points for commitment to a juvenile institution and for property offenders, a presentence diagnostic evaluation was the single most important factor in the decision to use manifest
injustice to increase the sentence.2 22 The use of manifest injustice was also significantly correlated to a current offense containing elements of sexual advance or abuse.2 23 Predisposition
evaluations are routinely conducted when the current offense
is a sex crime.2 24 Information supplied by sex offenders, prop-

erty offenders, and juvenile offenders with insufficient points
for commitment, during predisposition evaluations contributes
to an increase in the offenders' sentences.
In a disposition hearing in which manifest injustice is
sought, the juvenile's serious and clear danger to society must
be proved by a standard equivalent to "beyond a reasonable
doubt." The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
to protect an individual from an unjust loss of liberty. 225 Gault
and Winship unequivocally established that juveniles are entitled to constitutional protections against an unjust loss of lib-

erty. 226 Estelle v. Smith,227 Jones v. Cardwell, 22' and United

States v. Chitty22 9 each held that the privilege against selfincrimination protects an individual during sentencing. The
compelled nature of the predisposition evaluation and the risk
of increased punishment that can result from information
revealed during the evaluation strongly suggest that the constitutional right against self-incrimination should apply to protect
221. Id. at 7-8, 10.

222. DOYON, supra note 218, at 14.
223. Id. at 11.

224. Interview with L. Walton, Ass't Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Juvenile
Division, King Co. (October 1985).
225. State v. Smith, 33 Wash. App. 791, 795, 658 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1983).
226. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 50:
[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will,

whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' And our Constitution guarantees that
no person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is
threatened with a deprivation of his liberty-a command which this Court has
broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching
of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for
freedom.

227. 451 U.S. at 468.
228. 686 F.2d at 756.
229. 750 F.2d at 432.
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a juvenile from unknowingly enhancing his own sentence during a manifest injustice hearing.
It is important to ask which benefits, if any, the juvenile
justice system would lose or gain by expressly permitting the
fifth amendment privilege in sentencing. Proponents of an
individualized rehabilitation model of sentencing would argue
that if a juvenile offender exercises the fifth amendment protection and refuses to participate in a predisposition psychological evaluation, valuable information needed to inform the
most appropriate sentencing option would be lost to the court.
However, in a system that places primary reliance on just consequences for the crime committed, objective measures of dangerousness are readily available to the court without seeking a
psychological examination. Expediency has not justified the
denial of this privilege in other contexts. Miranda imposed
restrictions on police practices for gaining confessions even
though the practices may have yielded useful information.2 3 °
Criminal records and social reports conducted by experienced
probation staff can offer predictions on future dangerousness
without probing the offender's mental processes. Indeed,
clinical evaluations may vary widely because of the interpretive nature of a psychological evaluation.2 3 ' If each evaluation
can be contradicted by the evaluation of a different clinician,
then the court has no more guidance than it had before any
evaluations were conducted. If only one evaluation is conducted, the court may be relying on conclusions that are not
substantiated by hard evidence.2 3 2
One might also argue that full participation by the
offender at the sentencing phase of the proceeding initiates the
rehabilitative process. Guilt has already been determined. The
offender no longer has the need to deny responsibility for fear
of prosecution. The cathartic and healthy act of confession can
help the offender begin to assume responsibility for prosocial
behavior.
For purely treatment purposes, the rationale stated above
might be true. But the same events could also impede the
treatment process. If a juvenile engages fully in the evaluation
and reveals thoughts or behaviors not before disclosed to the
230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Note, supra note 81, at 667-68.
231. Note, supra note 81, at 660.
232. See Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (recognizing
conclusory nature of psychiatric testimony).
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court, this information can be used to justify a longer sentence
than might otherwise have been imposed. Trust in the promise
of rehabilitation could be severely damaged, defenses strongly
erected. Treatment, counseling, or educational activities may
be incorporated in most disposition orders.23 3 The rehabilitative process can be initiated just as well after the disposition
order has been made, and the risk of betraying the juvenile's
trust would be avoided.
Expressly extending the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to the use of predisposition evaluation
reports would not prohibit an intelligent waiver by the juvenile. There could be circumstances under which it would be in
the defendant's best interest to submit to such an evaluation,
such as establishing the presence of mitigating factors. 2" Full
extension of constitutional protections to the sentencing phase
of a proceeding benefits both the offender and the system by
installing procedures that are congruent with the principles
and values professed in American jurisprudence. The normative value of respect for the integrity of the individual is
enhanced. 3 5 Any doubt that a presentence evaluation implicates an individual's privilege against self-incrimination should
be resolved in favor of the individual. Fundamental fairness
demands nothing less.
V.

CONCLUSION

A clear articulation of the availability of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination during a disposition
hearing has not been available because the individualized,
rehabilitative model of sentencing has insulated the proceeding
from close constitutional scrutiny.2 3 6 Particularly in the area
of juvenile justice, where unlimited discretion in the name of
rehabilitation was standard procedure,2 3 7 there has been little
consideration of a juvenile offender's constitutional protections. In Washington, the juvenile code has expressly shifted
its underlying philosophy from one of rehabilitation to one of
233. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 117.
235. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7 (1978); Mashaw,
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus For Administrative Adjudication In Mathews
v. Eldrige, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976).
236. D. BOERNER, supra note 18, § 3.7 at 3-13.
237. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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proportionality and fairness.2 3
Criminal sanctions are just
consequences for acts committed, not prophylactic measures
against a downward career. Sentencing is therefore based on
quantifiable factors such as age, current offense, and criminal
history.23 9 The necessity for a predisposition evaluation to
guide the sentencing decision diminishes greatly under such a
model.
When a predisposition psychological
evaluation is
requested, a longer sentence through the use of manifest injustice typically results.2 40 Treatment and punishment issues
blur. The juvenile, through his participation in the evaluation,
unwittingly contributes to the justification used to extend his
incarceration. In a structure in which the discretion in sentencing is curtailed and standardized sentences are presumed to
apply, an offender should enjoy the same privilege against selfincrimination that clearly applies in the determination of guilt
or in the penalty phase of a capital case. The constitutional
protection against self-incrimination is available when disclosure in a criminal proceeding could deprive a person of his liberty. The use of presentence evaluation to establish factors
necessary to justify an exceptional sentence poses precisely
such a risk to a juvenile offender in Washington.
Judith H. Ramseyer

238. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
239. STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY, supra note 142, at
accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text.

10; supra note

51 and

